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Abstract
This paper investigates monetary shocks and the rôle of inventories
with respect to the occurrence of deﬂationary recessions. We propose a
non-tâtonnement approach involving temporary equilibria with rationing
in each period and price adjustment between successive periods. By am-
plifying spillover eﬀects inventories imply that, following a restrictive mon-
etary shock, the economy may converge to a quasi-stationary Keynesian
underemployment state, in which case money is persistently non-neutral.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, this is favored by suﬃcient downward
ﬂexibility of the nominal wage. The model is applied to the current deﬂa-
tionary Japanese recession, and we propose an economic policy to overcome
it.
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Why money aﬀects output and why it has long lasting eﬀects have long been
the two central questions for the business cycle literature, if not for all of macro-
economics. This is especially so because, as stressed for instance by Blanchard
(2000), the empirical evidence is irremediably at odds with the conclusions of the
ﬂexible-price models which still represent the approach most commonly shared by
economists.
If prices were fully ﬂexible, an increase in nominal money would immediately
induce a proportional increase in the price level oﬀsetting any pressure on demand
and output, and money would be neutral even in the short run. Prices and wages,
however, do not change instantaneously: they exhibit a certain degree of stickiness
and individual price changes tend to be staggered, which makes the adjustment
process of the price level more or less slow. During the process, aggregate demand
and output are higher than their original values, and the change in the money
stock has real eﬀects. Eventually, most economists maintain, the price level will
adjust proportionally to the increase in the nominal money stock, so that demand
and output will be back at their original levels, and money neutrality will be
restored. Before this occurs, real and nominal rigidities, lying behind the slow
adjustment of prices and wages, are the causes of the temporary non-neutrality
of money. Since the beginning of the Nineties, the New Keynesian literature (see
e.g. Ball and Romer, 1990, and Blanchard, 1987 and 1990) has emphasized that
monetary shocks determine large aggregate eﬀects when small frictions in nominal
adjustment are supplemented by real rigidities.1
1Much of the recent research in macroeconomics has concentrated on imperfections of la-
bor, goods, and ﬁnancial markets responsible for the emergence of real rigidities and nominal
stickiness and on their relevance for economic ﬂuctuations.
Many causes of real rigidities have been investigated in the literature: among others, eﬃciency
wages (see, for example, Solow, 1979, and Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), implicit contracts (Azari-
adis, 1975, and Baily, 1974), countercyclical mark-ups (Stiglitz, 1984, Rotemberg and Saloner,
1986, and Rotemberg and Woodford, 1991), inventories (Blinder, 1982), social customs (Akerlof,
1980, and Romer, 1984), strategic interactions and coordination failure (Ball and Romer, 1991),
credit markets imperfections (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989 and 1995, Holmström and Tirole,
1997, 1998, and Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997) and increasing returns (Kiyotaki, 1988, and Dia-
mond, 1982). Attention has been devoted as well to the sources of nominal stickiness focusing,
for instance, on menu cost or near rationality (e.g. Mankiw, 1985, and Akerlof and Yellen, 1985),
staggered contracts (Calvo, 1983) and uncertainty and risk aversion (Weinrich, 1997).
In the Nineties, Keynesian features - like the nominal and real stickiness just mentioned - have
been incorporated into the dynamic general equilibrium framework typical of the business cycle
2In this paper we aim to show that both claims presented in the theoretical
literature - about the long-run money neutrality and the eﬀectiveness of price
ﬂexibility to lead the economy quickly back to the pre-shock state - do not nec-
essarily hold. On the contrary, money can aﬀect the output level in the long run
and price and wage ﬂexibility can foster achieving this result, while wage rigidity
may prove a good recipe to avoid or overcome permanent underemployment and
to restore Walrasian equilibrium.
Our framework is that of a discrete-time dynamic non-tâtonnement macroeco-
nomic model, building on Bignami, Colombo and Weinrich (2004) and on Colombo
and Weinrich (2003a). The economy consists of an overlapping generations con-
sumption sector, of a production sector characterized by an atemporal production
function, and of a government that ﬁnances public expenditure by means of a tax
levied on ﬁrms’ proﬁts. Within each period, prices are ﬁxed and a consistent al-
location is obtained by means of temporary equilibrium with stochastic rationing
whereas prices are adjusted between successive periods according to the strength
of rationing or disequilibrium on each market in the previous period.2 This ap-
proach permits to account for the fact that in any economy with decentralized
price setting, the "adjustment of the general level of prices in terms of the nu-
m e r a i r ei sl i k e l yt ob es l o wr e l a t i v et oa( ﬁctional) economy with an auctioneer",
as emphasized by Blanchard (2000, p. 1393). It is important to stress that the
way we model the price (wage) adjustment mechanism allows us to account quite
naturally for diﬀerent degrees of price and wage ﬂexibility. Although our adjust-
ment mechanism is given exogenously - and thus it may be considered ad hoc -i t
allows us to assess the impact of price and wage reactions to shocks generated by
diﬀerent underlying conceptual models. In other words, it is "agnostic" enough
to provide a framework to study the impact of real and nominal rigidities in the
New Keynesian tradition, as well as to investigate the consequences for price and
wage adjustment of the presence of uncertainty (e.g. about the entity of mone-
tary transfers as in Lucas and Woodford, 1993, or about information that becomes
literature, originating what has been named the New Neoclassical Synthesis (see, for example,
Jeanne (1998) and the references in there).
2A natural idea is to relate the adjustment of prices to the size of the dissatisfaction of agents
with their (foregone) trades. A reliable measure of such a dissatisfaction requires stochastic
rationing, since - as opposed to deterministic rationing - it is compatible with manipulability
of the rationing mechanism and therefore provides an incentive for rationed agents to express
demands that exceed their expected trades, as argued by Green (1980), Svensson (1980), Douglas
Gale (1979, 1981) and Weinrich (1982, 1984, 1988). For a deﬁnition of manipulability see for
example Böhm (1989) or Weinrich (1988).
3public only at the end of the process as in Eden, 1994), or confusion (as in Lucas,
1972).
The novelty of the economy developed here with respect to the one considered
in our previous papers is that we abandon the simplifying assumption that there
are no inventories. In the present paper inventories are possible and stored goods
may be sold in periods subsequent to the period of their production. More pre-
cisely, at the beginning of each period the stock of inventories carried by each ﬁrm
is simply given by the ﬁrm’s output that remains unsold at the end of the previous
period. In this sense, inventories are not used as "strategic" decision variables by
ﬁrms, which makes our treatment of inventories diﬀerent from, and simpler than,
most of the accounts present in the recent literature (see, for instance, Blinder
and Fischer, 1981, Blinder, 1982 and Bental and Eden, 1996). However, in our
model as well, the explicit consideration of inventories adds a further propagation
mechanism for shocks and ampliﬁes the importance of the spillover eﬀects among
markets.
To highlight one of the main results of the paper, consider a restrictive mone-
tary shock that, starting from a Walrasian equilibrium, reduces aggregate demand,
inducing excess supply on the goods market and, consequently, a reduction in the
goods price. The decrease in aggregate demand reduces labor demand and gives
rise to an excess supply on the labor market as well, i.e. to Keynesian unemploy-
ment. Whenever the nominal wage is rigid downward, the real wage and the real
money stock increase until the economy leaves the state of Keynesian unemploy-
ment to enter a state of Classical unemployment, that is excess demand on the
goods market and excess supply on the labor market. At this point the goods
p r i c es t a r t st oi n c r e a s ea g a i n ,d e t e r m i n i n gar e d u c t i o no ft h er e a lw a g ea n do ft h e
real money stock until the economy converges back to the Walrasian equilibrium.
The process changes quite dramatically when there is downward wage ﬂexi-
bility. In this case, the monetary shock determines a reduction of the nominal
wage that, if it is large enough, implies a decrease of the real wage, too. The
presence of inventories reinforces this reduction, by increasing the fall of labor de-
mand which in turn depresses labor income and aggregate demand. The real wage
continues to fall although ever more slowly. Eventually the economy converges
to a quasi-stationary Keynesian state with a constant low real wage, permanent
unemployment and permanent deﬂation of the nominal variables. Therefore, con-
trary to the previous literature, downward nominal wage ﬂexibility favors a lasting
impact of monetary shocks whereas imposing downward nominal wage rigidity ap-
pears to be a viable policy to prevent the emergence of recessions or at least limit
4their extent and duration.
Moreover, we suggest, by means of numerical simulations, that such recession-
ary quasi-stationary equilibria are locally stable while the stationary Walrasian
equilibrium is locally unstable. Speciﬁcally, reductions in the real money stock
or in real proﬁts, and increases in the stock of inventories, destroy the full em-
ployment equilibrium and cause the economy to converge to a quasi-stationary
Keynesian equilibrium.
Besides the theoretical underpinnings on the role and consequences of inven-
tories dynamics the paper is of interest from a policy perspective. Our setup is,
in fact, able to account for the dynamic behavior of economies that are trapped
in situations of underemployment or underutilization of the productive capacity.
This proves very useful in evaluating the impact of alternative policy measures
aimed at restoring full employment. In this respect, we use our economy as a test
bank to investigate the deﬂationary behavior of the Japanese economy since the
early Nineties of the past century and to evaluate the performance of diﬀerent
monetary policies designed to stimulate the economy. More precisely, the reces-
sionary Keynesian equilibrium of our economy seems to reproduce quite well the
recent experience of the Japanese economy, and therefore it provides a suitable
framework to discuss the impact of diﬀerent economic policies.3 In particular,
we focus on policy measures requiring simultaneous ﬁscal and monetary expan-
sionary stimuli based on tax cuts directly ﬁnanced by the central bank to check
whether they are eﬀective in restoring full employment in our model economy.4
By operating a reduction of the tax rate and by maintaining unchanged both the
government’s budget deﬁcit and the aggregate demand (by means of a monetary
expansion), our analysis suggests that the stationary (and locally stable) long
run employment level increases monotonically with the decrease in the tax rate.
This conﬁrms the eﬃcacy of such policies that, provided they are of the right
3Although there are signs of recovery with respect to the drop in prices of the mid Nineties,
according to OECD statistics (OECD Main Economic Indicators, October 2004), the Japanese
consumer price index (base 2000=100) fell from 99.3 in 2001 to 98 in the second quarter 2004.
Similarly, the producer price index (base 2000=100) fell from 97.7 to 95.6 in the same period.
At the same time, the standardized unemployment rates increased steadily from 5% in 2001 to
5.3 % in 2003, to drop to 4.6% in the second quarter 2004.
4Similar policies have been called for by many economists and recently implemented by the
Bank of Japan which adopted a policy of quantitative monetary easing. Policies equivalent
to those outilined in the paper, for example, have been advocated by Ben Bernanke (see The
Economist, June 21st, 2003). Along the same lines, Auerbach and Obstfeld (2003) made a case
for the eﬃcacy of large open-market purchases of domestic government debt as a way out of the
recession for the Japanese economy.
5magnitude, should be capable to restore full employment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section two we present
the model and describe the behavior of consumers, producers and the government.
Section three focuses on temporary equilibria with rationing and proves the ex-
istence and uniqueness of equilibrium allocations. In section four we set up the
dynamic system. Section ﬁve presents numerical simulations and discusses the
impact of ﬁscal and monetary shocks. Section six investigates the Japanese de-
ﬂationary recession and discusses policy measures to overcome it. Finally, section
seven concludes, while proofs, some technical results and the complete dynamic
system are given in the appendices.
2. The Model
We consider an economy in which there are n OLG-consumers, n0 ﬁrms and a
government. Consumers oﬀer labor inelastically when young and consume a com-
posite consumption good in both periods. That good is produced by ﬁrms using an
atemporal production function whose only input is labor. The government levies
a proportional tax on ﬁrms’ proﬁts to ﬁnance its expenditure for goods. Never-
theless, budget deﬁcits and surpluses may arise and are made possible through
money creation or destruction.
2.1. Timing of the Model
In period t−1 producers obtain an aggregate proﬁto fΠt−1 which is distributed at
the beginning of period t in part as tax to the government (taxΠt−1) and in part
to young consumers ((1 − tax)Πt−1), where 0 ≤ tax ≤ 1. Also at the beginning
of period t old consumers hold a total quantity of money Mt, consisting of savings
g e n e r a t e di np e r i o dt − 1. Thus households use money as a means of transfer of
purchasing power between periods.5
Let Xt denote the aggregate quantity of the good purchased by young con-
sumers in period t, pt its price, wt the nominal wage and Lt the aggregate quantity
5We assume that, although the good is storable for ﬁrms, it is not so for consumers: they
do not have access to ﬁrms’ storage technology the cost of which is worthwhile to be borne for
large quantities only. Moreover, even if the good were storable by consumers, this would not be
convenient for them in case next period’s price is lower than the current period’s one. Thus our
main results, which regard deﬂationary recessionary equilibria, would not be inﬂuenced anyway.
6of labor. Then
Mt+1 =( 1− tax)Πt−1 + wtLt − ptXt.
Denoting with G the quantity of goods purchased by the government and taking
into account that old households want to consume all their money holdings in pe-
riod t, the aggregate consumption of young and old households and the government
is Yt = Xt+ Mt
pt +G. Using that Πt = ptYt−wtLt, considering Πt−Πt−1 = ∆MP
t as
the variation in the money stock held by producers before they distribute proﬁts
and denoting with ∆MC
t = Mt+1 − Mt the one referring to consumers, we obtain
the usual accounting identity, i.e. ∆MC
t +∆MP
t = ptG−taxΠt−1 = budget deﬁcit.
Denoting with St the aggregate amount of inventories carried over by ﬁrms to
period t and with Y
p
t the aggregate amount of goods produced in period t,t h e r e
results St+1 = Y
p
t + St − Yt.
2.2. The Consumption Sector
In his ﬁrst period of life each consumer born at t i se n d o w e dw i t hl a b o r s and
an amount of money (1 − tax)Πt−1/n while his preferences are described by the
utility function u(xt,x t+1)=xh
tx
1−h
t+1,0 <h<1, where x denotes consumption.6
In solving his decision problem the young household has to meet the budget con-
straints
0 ≤ xt ≤ ω
i
























denote the consumer’s real wealth when he is unemployed and employed, respec-
tively. Implicit in this formulation is that rationing on the labor market is of the
all-or-nothing type and that the labor market is visited before the goods market.
On the goods market the young household succeeds to buy its quantity de-
manded xd
t with probability γd
t and is rationed to zero with probability 1 − γd
t,
where γd
t ∈ [0,1] is a rationing coeﬃcient that the household perceives as given
but that will be determined in equilibrium. Hence, the expected value of xt is
γd
txd
t, meaning that rationing is proportional and thus manipulable.
A household may also be rationed when old. Assuming again 0/1-rationing,
the probability that it expects in period t not to be rationed in period t +1
6See Colombo and Weinrich (2003b) for a more general approach to the consumer’s problem.
7is denoted by δ
e
t+1. Denoting moreover with θ
e
t the expected value of θt,t h e
eﬀective demand xdi









1−h . The solution is xdi
t = hωi
t.T h u st h ey o u n gc o n s u m e r ’ s





t b u ti td o e sd e p e n do nt h er e a l
income ωi
t and hence on whether the consumer has been employed.
The aggregate supply of labor is Ls = n s. Denoting with Ld
t the aggregate
demand of labor and with λ
s






the fraction of young consumers that


































The total eﬀective aggregate demand of the consumption sector is then obtained







t;αt,(1 − tax)πt)+mt + G
where αt ≡ wt/pt, πt ≡ Πt−1/pt and mt ≡ Mt/pt.
2.3. The Production Sector
Each of the n0 identical ﬁrms uses an atemporal production function y
p
t = f ( t)=
a b
t,a,b>0. Having transferred stocks from the previous period and being thus
e n d o w e dw i t hi n v e n t o r i e sst at the beginning of period t, the total amount supplied
by a ﬁrm is ys
t = y
p
t +st.A sw i t hc o n s u m e r s ,ﬁrms too may be rationed, by means
of a rationing mechanism analogous to that assumed for the consumption sector.
Denoting the single ﬁrm’s eﬀective demand of labor by  d
t, the quantity of labor
eﬀectively transacted is  d
t with probability λ
d





t ∈ [0,1]. It is obvious that E t = λ
d
t d
t. On the goods market the rationing rule




t, with prob. σγs
t
dtys
t, with prob. 1 − σγs
t
,
where σ ∈ (0,1),γs
t ∈ [0,1] and dt =( γs
t − σγs
t)/(1 − σγs
t).σis a ﬁxed parameter
of the mechanism whereas λ
d
t and γs
t are perceived rationing coeﬃcients taken as
given by the ﬁrm the eﬀective value of which will be determined in equilibrium.
8The deﬁnition of dt implies that Eyt = γs
tys
t which, in particular, it is independent




The ﬁrm’s eﬀective demand  d
t =  d (γs

































+ st. The upper bound on labor demand
reﬂe c t st h ef a c tt h a tt h eﬁrm must be prepared to ﬁnance labor service purchases
even if rationed on the goods market (since the labor market is visited ﬁrst it will
know whether it is rationed on the goods market only after it has hired labor). In
general the solution depends on this constraint but it is not binding (see Appendix
1, Lemma 1) if we make the assumption b ≤ 1 − σ. In this case labor demand is
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Notice that labor demand is independent of st. The aggregate labor demand then
is Ld
t = n0 d (γs
t;αt) ≡ Ld (γs
t;αt) and, because only a fraction λ
d
t of ﬁrms can hire






















3. Temporary Equilibrium Allocations
For any given period t we can now describe a feasible allocation as a temporary
equilibrium with rationing as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.1. : Given a real wage αt, ar e a lp r o ﬁt level πt, real money balances












6and an aggregate allocation ¡
Lt,Y t
¢
constitute a temporary equilibrium if the following conditions are fulﬁlled:
















t;αt,(1 − tax)πt)+δtmt + εtG;
















t (1 − δt)=0 ;δt (1 − εt)=0 .
9Conditions (1) and (2) require that expected aggregate transactions balance.







t.E q u a t i o n s( 3 )f o r m a l i z et h es h o r t - s i d er u l ea c c o r d i n gt ow h i c h
at most one side on each market is rationed. The meaning of the coeﬃcients δt
and εt in equations (2) and (4) is that also old households and/or the government
can be rationed. However, according to condition (4) this may occur only after
young households have been rationed (to zero).
As shown in the table below it is possible to distinguish diﬀerent types of
equilibrium according to which market sides are rationed: excess supply on both
markets is called Keynesian Unemployment [K], excess demand on both markets
Repressed Inﬂation [I], excess supply on the labor market and excess demand on
the goods market Classical Unemployment [C] and excess demand on the labor
market with excess supply on the goods market Underconsumption [U].
K I C U
λ
s
t < 1 =1 < 1 =1
λ
d
t =1 < 1 =1 < 1
γs
t < 1 =1 =1 < 1
γd
t =1 < 1 < 1 =1
δt =1 ≤ 1 ≤ 1 =1
εt =1 ≤ 1 ≤ 1 =1
Of course there are further intermediate cases which, however, can be considered
as limiting cases of the above ones. In particular, when all the rationing coeﬃcients
are equal to one, we are in a Walrasian Equilibrium.7
Existence and uniqueness of temporary equilibrium are established by the
following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. For any quadruple of variables (αt,m t,πt,S t), with αt strictly
positive and mt,πt and St non-negative, and any non-negative pair of policy para-





Lt is given by
Lt =m i n
n




≡ L(αt,πt,m t,S t,G,tax)
(3.1)
7For an illustration of equilibrium regimes and their representation in the p − w plane, see
Colombo and Weinrich (2003b).

























Y t ≡ Y (αt,πt,m t,S t,G,tax) is determined as follows. If Lt = e L(·),t h e nY t =
αt






St,a n di fLt = Ld (1,α t),t h e nY t = αt
b Ld (1,α t)+St. Finally,
if Lt = Ls,t h e nY t =m i n
©
αt
b Ls + St,h(1 − tax)πt + hαtLs + mt + G
ª
.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
For the sake of illustration let us consider a situation of Keynesian Unem-
ployment. This type of equilibrium involves rationing of households on the labor




















(where we have suppressed all arguments that are not rationing coeﬃcients).
The consumption sector supplies the amount of labor Ls > Lt and demands the
quantity of goods Y d
t = Y t whereas ﬁrms demand labor Ld
t = Lt and supply Y s
t >
Y t of goods. It follows that λ
s
t = Lt/Ls,γs




t =1( =δt = εt),
which are just the values that led households and ﬁrms to express their respective
transaction oﬀers. Thus their expectations regarding these rationing coeﬃcients
are conﬁrmed. Nevertheless, due to the randomness in rationing at an individual
agent’s level, eﬀective aggregate demands and supplies of rationed agents exceed
their actual transactions. Moreover, as indicated earlier, these excesses can be
used to get an indicator of the strength of rationing. Since there is zero-one
rationing on the labor market, 1 − λ
s
t =( Ls − Lt)/Ls is the ratio of the number
of unemployed workers and the total number of young households. Regarding the
goods market, in a K-equilibrium Y t − γs
tY s (1,γs






















t > 0. So a decrease in Y t (for example due
to a reduction of government spending), and thus an aggravation of the shortage
of aggregate demand for ﬁrms’ goods, is unambiguously related to an increase in
1−γs
t which can therefore be interpreted as a measure of the strength of rationing
on the goods market. A similar reasoning justiﬁes the use as rationing measures
of the terms 1 − λ
d
t and 1 − γd
t in the other equilibrium regimes.
4. Dynamics
So far our analysis has been essentially static. For any given vector (αt,πt,m t,S t,G,
tax) we have described a feasible allocation in terms of a temporary equilibrium
with rationing. To extend now our analysis to a dynamic one we must link succes-
sive periods one to another. This link will of course be given by the adjustment
of prices but also by the changes in the stock of money and in proﬁts. Regarding
the latter, this is automatic by deﬁnition of these variables and equations (3.1) to
(3.3), i.e.
Πt = ptY (αt,πt,m t,S t,G,tax) − wtL(αt,πt,m t,G,tax),
Mt+1 =( 1 − tax)Πt−1 + wtLt − ptY t + δtMt + εtptG









− Y (αt,πt,m t,S t,G,tax).
As for the adjustment of prices and wages we assume that, whenever an excess
of demand (supply) is observed, the price rises (falls). In terms of the rationing
coeﬃcients observed in period t, this amounts to
pt+1 <p t ⇔ γ
s
t < 1; pt+1 >p t ⇔ γ
d
t < 1,
wt+1 <w t ⇔ λ
s
t < 1; wt+1 >w t ⇔ λ
d
t < 1.




[1 − µ1 (1 − γs
t)]pt if γs









t < 1 (4.1)
wt+1 =
½















12where µ1, µ2, ν1, ν2 ∈ [0,1]. Then the adjustment equations for the real wage are
αt+1 =

              


































































∈ C ∪ I
. (4.4)
The dynamics of the model in real terms is given by the sequence {(αt,m t,π t,S t)}
∞
t=1,
where αt+1 is as in (4.3) and, using equations (3.1) to (3.3),
πt+1 =

         
         
1−b












































[h(1 − tax)πt + hαtL


















+ St − Y t.









. This will be done in Appendix 3 where there will be also
given the corresponding explicit equations of the complete dynamic system.
5. Simulations
The non-linear dynamic system describing our economy cannot be fully studied
by means of analytical tools only. This is due to the fact that the system is four-
dimensional, with state variables αt,m t,π t and St. Moreover, since there are four
nondegenerate equilibrium regimes, the overall dynamic system can be viewed as
being composed of four subsystems each of which may become eﬀective through
endogenous regime switching.
In order to get some insights in these dynamics we resort to numerical simula-
tions.8 The basic parameter set speciﬁes values for the technological coeﬃcients
(a and b), the exponent of the utility function (h), the labor supply (Ls)a n dt h e
total number of producers in the economy (n0), for the price adjustment speeds
downward and upward (respectively µ1 and µ2) and the corresponding wage ad-
justment speeds (ν1 and ν2). We also specify initial values for the real wage, real
money stock, real proﬁt level and inventories (α0,m 0,π0 and S0), and values for
t h eg o v e r n m e n tp o l i c yp a r a m e t e r s( G and tax). Choosing in addition an initial
value p0 for the goods price, we can moreover keep track of the development of
the nominal variables by using (4.1) to determine pt for any t from which follow
wt = αtpt and Mt = mtpt.
Assuming the parameter values a =1 ,b=0 .85,h=0 .5, Ls =1 0 0and
n0 = 100, a stationary Walrasian equilibrium is obtained for
α∗ =0 .85,m ∗ =4 6 .25,π ∗ =1 5 ,S ∗ =0 ,G ∗ =7 .5,t a x ∗ =0 .5, (5.1)
with trading levels L∗ = Y ∗ = 100. For the adjustment speeds of prices out of
Walrasian equilibrium we set µ1 = µ2 = ν2 =0 .1 whereas ν1, the downward
8Our numerical analysis is using programs written for this paper’s purposes based on the
packages GAUSS and MACRODYN . MACRODYN has been developed at the University of Bielefeld.
See Böhm,V., Lohmann, M. and U. Middelberg (1999), MACRODYN — a dynamical system’s tool
kit, version x99.
14speed of wage adjustment, will be varied between 0 and 0.1. This includes the
case ν1 =0in which the wage rate is rigid downwards.
We consider a restrictive monetary shock determining a reduction in the initial
money stock to m0 =4 0 , keeping all other parameters and initial values at their
Walrasian levels. Having set p0 =1 , this is equivalent to a reduction in the nominal
money stock from M0 =4 6 .25 to M0 =4 0 .S i n c em0 is the demand of old agents
at time t =0 , aggregate demand is reduced. Consequently there is excess supply
o nt h eg o o d sm a r k e t( a n dar e d u c t i o ni nt h eg o o d sp r i c e )a n d ,a sﬁrms adjust
to the reduced transaction level on the goods market, they reduce their labor
demand. Thus there is excess supply on the labor market, too, and the economy
enters in a state of Keynesian unemployment. What happens next depends on
whether the nominal wage is ﬂexible downwards. If not, the real wage and the
real money stock increase - as shown in Figure 5.1 - until the economy reaches a
state of Classical unemployment, with excess demand on the goods market and
excess supply on the labor market. Thereafter the price starts increasing, which
determines a reduction of the real wage until the system is back at the Walrasian
equilibrium. With the nominal wage rigid downwards the restrictive money shock
has had a temporary but not lasting eﬀect on economic activity.
The picture changes when downward wage ﬂexibility is allowed. If the de-
crease in the wage rate is larger than the decrease in the goods price, the real
wage decreases, and it may continue to decrease permanently approaching a limit
level below the Walrasian real wage. The lower real wage diminishes labor in-
come of workers which diminishes aggregate goods demand which in turn keeps
employment below full employment. The dynamical system converges to a quasi-
stationary Keynesian state with permanent deﬂation of all nominal variables but
constant real magnitudes.9 The nominal money stock shrinks because, due to the
falling government spending in nominal terms, the government is permanently
realizing a budget surplus: ∆M = ptG−taxΠt−1 < 0. These facts are illustrated
in Figure 5.2 which shows time series for ν1 =0 .025. The restrictive monetary
shock has caused a permanent decrease in employment and output.
I n v e n t o r i e sa r ei m p o r t a n th e r ea st h e i rp r e s e n c ea m p l i ﬁes the fall of labor
demand by ﬁrms, further depressing real labor income and aggregate demand. In
fact, when aggregate demand is diminished due to a decrease in m0, inventories
become positive and rise further as excess supply on the goods market builds






by (2) of Deﬁnition 3.1 and St inﬂuences Y s
9As t a t ei sstationary if all variables are constant; it is quasi-stationary i fa l lr e a lv a r i a b l e s
are constant but the nominal variables may change.
15Figure 5.1: Time series when ν1 =0and m0 =4 0 .
16Figure 5.2: Time series when ν1 =0 .025 and m0 =4 0 .
17Figure 5.3: Stationary employment values when m0 =4 0 .
positively by (2.3), an increase in St reduces the sales expectation ratio γs which
by (2.2) diminishes the labor demand of ﬁrms and thus increases further the excess
supply on the labor market. Therefore the downward ﬂexible wage rate decreases
more than would be the case without inventories. Indeed, setting St ≡ 0 changes
the outcome in the scenario of a monetary shock, with the economy returning to
the Walrasian equilibrium (see Colombo and Weinrich, 2003b). The real wage
decreases initially but then the decrease in the goods price dominates the one in
the nominal wage, and the real wage moves back to its Walrasian level, as do all
the other variables.
At this point the natural question is which downward wage ﬂexibility is needed
to drive the economy into a permanent recession or even depression. The answer
is given in the bifurcation diagram of Figure 5.3. From there it can be seen that
approximately until ν1 =0 .018 the economy is capable of returning to the full
employment after the monetary shock, whereas for speeds of wage adjustment
larger than this the economy gets trapped in underemployment.
The fact that a restrictive monetary shock may lead to a Keynesian quasi-
stationary state as limit of the dynamic system’s trajectory raises the question
of the stability of such a state. Analogously, the stability of the stationary Wal-
rasian state may be investigated. Numerical simulations suggest that the quasi-
stationary Keynesian unemployment state is locally stable, whereas the station-
ary Walrasian equilibrium is locally unstable. Speciﬁcally, reductions in the real
money stock or in real proﬁts, and increases in the stock of inventories, destroy
the full employment equilibrium and cause the economy to converge to a quasi-
18stationary Keynesian equilibrium.10
6. Policy and the Japanese Deﬂationary Recession
As recalled in the Introduction, the performance of the Japanese economy in the
last decade with prolonged recession, unemployment, overcapacity/excess invento-
ries and falling prices and nominal wages ﬁts into our scenario of a quasi-stationary
state with Keynesian unemployment. Thus we are challenged to apply the insights
from our theoretical model to the Japanese case.
The reasons why Japan has been in trouble for so long (and in some respects
still is) are not unanimously shared by economists.11 On the one hand it is argued
that Japan’s deﬂation has been largely structural and that the money-transmission
system was not working because banks, saddled with bad loans, were not able to
lend more than they actually did. So the priority was to ﬁx the banking system.
On the other hand, a standard Keynesian argument is that, when an economy
is in a liquidity trap, a ﬁscal stimulus can boost demand. Japan’s public debt
appears, however, to be too big already and thus to ﬁnance a ﬁscal stimulus in a
conventional way seems not possible. An alternative approach has been suggested
by Ben Bernanke, namely, that the government enact tax cuts and the Bank of
Japan ﬁnance them directly, paying for the forgone tax revenue to the government,
so that the debt burden does not change.12
In the framework of our model we can emulate Bernanke’s proposal by reducing
the tax rate from tax∗ =0 .5 to a new value tax so that the income of (young)
consumers out of proﬁt after taxation is
(1 − tax)π =( 1− tax
∗)π + ∆m,
10See Colombo and Weinrich (2003b) for a numerical analysis and discussion of the point.
11The strenght of the actual recovery is still to be fully assessed, being so much exposed to
esternal shocks and economic conditions elsewhere, notably in China and the US. Furthermore,
deﬂationary pressures have not been fully eliminated yet.
12In this way the "Bank of Japan would mitigate the usual concerns about rising debt: debt
purchases by the central bank rather than the private sector implies no net increase in debt
service and hence no future tax increases. Consumers should then be more willing to spend
rather than save any tax cut. It also gets around the Bank of Japan’s concern about the
blocked money-transmission mechanism: a joint monetary and ﬁscal boost will increase spending




Moreover, if the central bank pays for the reduction in taxes paid by consumers,
the government’s tax income is (as before)
tax · π + ∆m = tax
∗ · π.
The government’s budget deﬁcit in real terms can then be written
G
∗ − tax
∗ · π = G
∗ − tax · π − ∆m =( G
∗ − ∆m) − tax · π.
This is equivalent to a simultaneous balanced reduction in government spending
to G = G∗ − ∆m and in taxes.
As for the dynamic performance of the economy, starting from the quasi-
stationary Keynesian unemployment state and setting government spending more
precisely to G = tax · π∗,w i t hπ∗ the Walrasian value of real proﬁts so that
the government’s budget is balanced at any Walrasian equilibrium, the result
is displayed in Figure 6.1. The ﬁg u r es h o w st h a tar e d u c t i o ni nt h et a xr a t e
monotonicly increases the long-run stationary locally stable value of employment.
M o r e o v e r ,a tav a l u eo ftax approximately equal to 0.17, stationary Walrasian
equilibrium with full employment is reached. Note that the horizontal lines in
Figure 6.1 refer to the stationary employment values for values of tax ≤ 0.17 and
tax =0 .2,0.3,...,1.13
The proposed policy, however, is a standard balanced-budget ﬁscal policy (in
the form of a tax reduction) which, as expected from textbook economics, in
the short-run determines an all but welcome reduction of employment below an
already low stationary initial level. To avoid this, a simultaneous increase in the
money stock m0 can be used, ensuring that subsequent employment values increase
monotonically to full employment.14 This shows that the combined measure of
tax reduction and expansive monetary policy works well in our model economy.
A policy of quantitative monetary easing is indeed what is currently implemented
13The stationary values corresponding to tax =0 .5=tax∗ are the limit values of the simula-
tion shown in Figure 5.2 and are (approximately)
α =0 .8281, m =3 1 .9263, π =1 5 .7889, S =6 .4060,
with a stationary employment level L =6 6 .9342.
14For a detailed analysis of the dynamics see Colombo and Weinrich (2003b).










Figure 6.1: Stationary locally stable values of employment depending on diﬀerent
balanced-budget tax quotas.
by the Bank of Japan and likely to be maintained until consumer-price inﬂation
is expected to turn positive again.
Our model economy can also provide a useful analytical setup to evaluate the
current debate about the Bank of Japan’s best “exit strategy” from its current
expansive policy once the economy will be back on a solid track. Many observers
believe that the Bank of Japan should have set an inﬂation target to reassure
ﬁnancial markets that it will not increase interest rates too early – hampering
r e c o v e r y ,a si th a sd o n ei nt h ep a s t–o nt h eo n eh a n d ,a n dw i l ln o ta l l o wi n ﬂation
to get out of control, on the other hand.15 Ito and Mishkin (2004), however,
propose to set a price-level target instead, arguing it to be more adequate when
an economy is suﬀering deﬂation for it implies “a compensating period of higher-
than-normal inﬂation”, hence having a “bigger eﬀect in reducing real interest
rates” and helping “repair balance sheets”, as recently stressed by The Economist
(October 2, 2004). Our setting oﬀers a theoretical framework to think about
this issue, as the idea of ﬁxing a price level target is intrinsically paired with the
necessity to deﬁne and link a sequence of consistent (dis)equilibrium allocations
as provided for by the concept of temporary equilibrium with rationing.
15See Ito (2004) for a political economy analysis of why inﬂation targeting has not been
adopted.
217. Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a non-tâtonnement dynamic macroeconomic
model involving temporary equilibria with ﬁxprices and stochastic rationing in
each period, and price adjustment between periods. The model allows for trade
also when prices are not at their market clearing levels, and consistent allocations
are described in every period, obeying at the same time a well deﬁned dynam-
ics. This approach has enabled us to study, in a general-equilibrium setting, the
dynamic functioning of an economy in which disequilibrium phenomena like un-
deremployment, inﬂation and excess productive capacities are allowed to occur.
These disequilibrium situations typically arise because the adjustment of prices
to market imbalances is not instantaneous but proceeds with ﬁnite speed only;
thus their functioning as an allocation device is imperfect, though not nil. As a
consequence, quantity adjustments have to take place which complement prices
in their task of making trades feasible.
On the other hand, the fact that prices do adjust in our model renders possible
to also work out the possible negative eﬀects of too large a price and wage ﬂexibil-
ity. If aggregate demand is insuﬃcient, price and wage ﬂexibility together with the
possibility of a declinining nominal money stock (due to government surpluses)
may lead to a quasi-stationary situation in which there is permanent deﬂation of
nominal variables but all real variables - among which most importantly employ-
ment - remain constant. This is so if the decrease in nominal money is proportional
to the one in price and wage, because then the real stock of money held by con-
sumers does not change. Thus it is possible that, in addition to the real wage,
also the real wealth of households remains constant or, in other words, there is no
real-balance eﬀect. Vice versa, if the nominal wage is rigid downwards, then the
real wage is eventually bound to increase, and aggregate-demand deﬁciency cannot
persist in the long run. It is worth emphasizing that these results depend crucially
on the possibility of modelling the quantity spillover eﬀects between markets in
disequilibrium, which in turn is rendered possible using as modelling strategy the
non-tâtonnement approach and the adoption of the concept of equilibrium with
quantity rationing.
Finally, the recessionary (Keynesian) equilibrium emerging in our economy
resembles closely to what we have been witnessing for Japan since the beginning
of the Nineties and until very recently, with increasing unemployment rates and
decreasing prices and wages. Our framework provides therefore for a valid test
bank to check the eﬃcacy of alternative economic policies designed to escape the
22crisis, and for a conceptual setup to interpret the ongoing debate about the policies
that are (or should be) implemented by the Bank of Japan. In the paper, we have
focused explicitly on a mix of expansionary ﬁscal and monetary policies along
the lines recently proposed by Ben Bernanke, concluding that they point in the
right direction for restoring full employment, provided they are of the appropriate
magnitude.
23Appendix 1: Lemma 1.
Lemma 1.When b ≤ 1 − σ, the solution to the ﬁrm’s maximization problem is












Proof. The ﬁrst order condition for an interior solution of the ﬁrm’s problem is
γsf0 ( )=α ⇔ γsbf ( )
 
= α ⇔   = γsbf ( )
α
.




1−σ yield 1 ≤ 1−σ
b(1−γsσ). From this follows
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which proves our claim. ¥
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 3.2.
Since we hold {αt,m t,πt,S t }and (G,tax) ﬁxed, we omit them whenever possible as












and its subsets H
K = H |γd=1,λs<1, H
I = H |γd<1,λs=1, H
C = H |γd<1,λs<1 and H
U
= H |γd=1,λs=1 . Using the terminology introduced by Honkapohja and Ito (1985), we




K + {(0,m t + G)} =
n³
λsLs,Xd (λs)+mt + G
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24we deﬁne the production sector’s trade curves as F
K = F |λd=1,γs<1, F
I = F |λd<1,γs=1,
F
C = F |λd=1,γs=1and F
























whereas from f ( )=a b follows f0 ( )=b
f( )
  , which implies f ( )=1
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t;αt) is strictly increasing in γs
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. (7.2)
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= γs ≤ 1, F
K is positioned below F
I.
Finally consider F



























I, it is clear that F
U is the set of points contained between
F
K and F
I. Figure 7.1 illustrates the producers’ trade curves.
26Using the consumption sector’s and the production sector’s trade curves and indi-
















































To show existence of an equilibrium is equivalent to showing that Z is not empty.

























= h(1 − tax)πt + hαtλs
tLs.
Deﬁning the function







is the part of the graph of Γt for which L ≤ Ls.

















for which L ≤ Ld(1). Notice that the graphs of the functions Γt and ∆t always intersect.
Indeed, Γ0
t (L)=hαt and Γt (0) = h(1 − tax)πt+mt+G>0,whereas ∆0
t (L) ≥ αt
b >h α t
(since 1/b > 1 >h )a n d∆t (0) = 0. Setting ∆t (L)=Γt (L) yields (3.2) with the
unique solution denoted e L(αt,πt,m t,G,tax). Therefore the equilibrium level on the
labor market is
Lt =m i n
n
e L(αt,πt,m t,G,tax),L d (1,α t),L s
o
= L(αt,πt,m t,S t,G,tax)
whereas the one the goods market is, by deﬁnition of the function Y (·),
Y t = Y (αt,πt,m t,S t,G,tax).




=( L(αt,πt,m t,S t,G,tax),Y (αt,πt,m t,S t,G,tax))
27exists and is uniquely deﬁned. ¥
Appendix 3: The explicit complete dynamic system
The dynamic system is given by four diﬀerent subsystems, one for each of the equi-
librium types K, I, C and U, and endogenous regime switching. For given (G,tax), any




being of one of the above types (or of an intermediate one). More precisely, equa-
tion (3.1) allows us to characterize the type of equilibrium deﬁn e di nT a b l e1 : i f
Lt = e L(αt,πt,m t,S t,G,tax), the resulting equilibrium is of type K or a limiting case of
it. If Lt = Ld (1,α t),t y p eC or a limiting case of it occurs. Finally, if Lt = Ls,a ne q u i -
librium of type I or a limiting case results if αt
b Ls+St ≤ h(1 − tax)πt+hαtLs+mt+G;








of type T0 6= T.
The above discussion and Proposition 3.2 allow us to determine the expressions of
those rationing coeﬃcients which are possibly smaller than one. This is summarized in
the following corollary of Proposition 3.2.
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t = Lt/Ld (γs
t;αt).
















































tSt = Y t
Recalling that λdLd (γs;αt)=Lt and solving for γs
t yields the claimed expression.
In all cases, the values of λs
t and λd
t are immediate by deﬁnition. The value of γs
t
in case K can be obtained using equation (2.2). Finally, γd
t,δ t,ε t are determined by
means of Deﬁnition 3.1 and (2.1). ¥
We can now give the explicit equations of all subsystems of the dynamical system.
Keynesian unemployment system
Employment level: Lt = e L(αt,πt,m t,S t,G,tax).
Output level: Y t = αt


















t =1 ,δ t = εt =1 .
Price inﬂation: θt =1− µ1 (1 − γs
t).





Real proﬁt: πt+1 = 1
θt
¡
Y t − αtLt
¢
= 1−b
θt(1−hb) [h(1 − tax)πt + mt + G].
Real money stock: mt+1 = 1
θt [mt + G +( 1− tax)πt] − πt+1.






1−b + St − Y t.
Repressed inﬂation system
Lt = Ls.
Y t = αt
b Lt + St.
λs




If Y t ≥ G + mt, then γd
t = Y t−mt−G
h(1−tax)πt+hαtLt,δ t = εt =1 ;
if G + mt > Y t ≥ G, then γd
t =0 ,δ t = Y t−G
mt ,ε t =1 ;
if Y t <G ,then γd





































1−b + St − Y t.
Classical Unemployment System
Lt = Ld (1,α t).
Y t = αt




t =1 ,γ s
t =1 ;
if Y t ≥ G + mt, then γd
t = Y t−mt−G
h(1−tax)πt+hαtLt,δ t = εt =1 ;
if G + mt > Y t ≥ G, then γd
t =0 ,δ t = Y t−G
mt ,ε t =1 ;
if Y t <G ,then γd








































1−b + St − Y t.
Underconsumption
Lt = Ls.
Y t = h(1 − tax)πt + hαtLs + mt + G.
λs


















t =1 ,δ t = εt =1 .










Y t − αtLt
¢
= 1
θt [h(1 − tax)πt + mt + G − αt (1 − h)Ls].
mt+1 = 1








1−b + St − Y t.
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